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PARTIES
The caption of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals shows the names of all parties to
the proceeding in the court below. Stephen E. Harvey, individually and as general guardian of
Amanda Harvey, a minor, is the Plaintiff/Appellant. For unknown reasons, the caption in
Appellant's Brief shows Amanda Harvey as Plaintiff/Appellant.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

2

Disposition of the Court Below

3

Relief Sought on Appeal

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENT

8

POINT I

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO BEAR RIVER
BECAUSE THE APPLICABLE STATUTE,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(10)(6), DOES
NOT ALLOW FOR STACKING OF
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS

8

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
BEAR RIVER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE HARVEYS'
CLAIM TO UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
BENEFITS AROSE ON THE DATE OF THE
ACCIDENT

14

i

Page

B.

POINT III

POINT IV

Utah case law supports Bear River's position that the
claim for underinsured motorist coverage arose on the
date of the accident

14

Bear River's auto insurance policy clearly states
that underinsured motorist benefits arise from the
time of the accident and that claims for
underinsured motorist coverage may not be added
together, combined or stacked to determine
insurance coverage

16

BEAR RIVER'S AUTO INSURANCE POLICY
IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THE
HARVEYS MAY NOT CREATE AMBIGUITY
BY SIMPLY ASSIGNING A DIFFERENT
MEANING TO THE POLICY THAT FAVORS
THEIR INTERESTS

17

APPLICATION OF THE STACKING
AMENDMENT TO THE HARVEYS' CLAIM
WOULD INFRINGE UPON BEAR RIVER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM
FROM IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT . . .

20

CONCLUSION

22

ADDENDUM A:

Judge Noel's Ruling on Summary
Judgment. (R. 65-67.)

ADDENDUM B:

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(6).(R.33-35.)

ADDENDUM C:

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(b). (R. 36-37.)

ADDENDUM D:

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, NonAssessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy,
Cover and Part C2. (R.60-61.)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Brunyer v. Salt Lake County
551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976)

12, 13

Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Assoc.
589 P.2d 780 (Utah 1979)

18

Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commis.
725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986)

15, 16, 22

Crowther v. Carter
767 P.2d 129 (Utah App. 1989)

18

Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992)
Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n.
520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)
Petty v. Clark
192 P.2d 589 (1948)

17, 19

9, 14, 16
10

Pilcher v. State
663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)

10

Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts
768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989)

18

Provo City Corp. V. Nielson Scott Co.
603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979)

18

Public Utility Dist No. 1 of Klickitat County
v. International Ins. Co.. 881 P.2d
1020 (Wash. 1994)

18

Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.
618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980)

17

iii

Page
Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake Citv
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)

9

State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gant.
478 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1985)

21, 22

Stephens v. Henderson
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987)

9, 12, 13, 14, 16

United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Park City Corp.
397 F. Supp. 411 (D. Ore. 1973)
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. V. Sandt
854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993)

9
9, 19

Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
790 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1990)
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs.
795 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1990)
Weese v. Davis County Comm'n
834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992)

18
10, 11, 12, 13, 20
1

Wulfenstein v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Assoc.
611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980)

14
Statutes Cited

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305

20
5, 6, 8, 13, 22

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(l)(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(6)

1, 8, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(b) (1993)

3, 8, 13
iv

Page
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B)

1, 5, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-704

15

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-7(1) (1953)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3

1,9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1

Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 25

1,5

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)

1
Other Authorities Cited

I, Miller's Standard Insurance Policies Annotated (1986)

v

18

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§78-2-2(3)(k), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)(j). Judge Noel's Order granting summary judgment
was entered on March 6, 1997. (R. 67-68). Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on March
19, 1997. (R. 69-72). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals on or about June 2, 1997.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). On
appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court resolves only legal issues, determines
whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and determines whether the trial
court correctly held that no genuine issue of fact was in dispute. Weese v. Davis County
Comm'n. 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issue is presented for review:
ISSUE I: Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the rights and obligations
of Rear River and the Harveys were fixed at a date not later than the date of the Amanda
Harvey's accident for the purpose of applying Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(6), which
prohibits stacking underinsured motorist benefits.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.

Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(6).
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B).
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3.
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 25.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case arises from a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance benefits. On
August 14, 1993, Amanda Harvey was injured in an automobile accident while she was a
passenger in an automobile driven by Kyle Schwartz, who was insured by Allstate Insurance
Company. The accident involved a second vehicle driven by Wally Vickers. Vickers's vehicle
was insured by Prudential Insurance Company. Amanda Harvey's father, Stephen E. Harvey,
was insured through Bear River for auto insurance which included underinsured motorist
coverage.
Amanda has received the entire amount of Allstate's liability coverage for its driver
Kyle Schwartz in the sum of $100,000. Amanda has also received $80,000 from Prudential to
settle the liability of Wally Vickers.
Amanda has also received the entire amount of the Allstate UIM coverage, $10,000,
which she was entitled to receive under the law which existed at the time of her injury. What
she has not received—and her claim in this action—is for another (second) UIM limit of
$10,000 from Bear River, which had issued its policy to Amanda's parents.
At the time Bear River issued its policy, and at the time of Amanda's injury, Utah law
did not allow a claim for this second UIM limit (stacking) against Bear River. Two years
later, effective May 1, 1995, the Utah Legislature changed the law to allow stacking.
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Still later, in January and February, 1996, Amanda's lawyers got around to finalizing
her settlement with Allstate based on the negligence of its insured, Kyle Schwartz. At that
time, Allstate also paid its UIM limit of $10,000.
Stephen E. Harvey, general guardian of his minor daughter, filed this action against
Bear River claiming that Amanda Harvey was entitled to UIM benefits from Bear River in
addition to the UIM benefits Amanda received from Allstate Insurance Company. The Harveys
claim that they are entitled to the benefit of the 1995 change in the law. The District Court
granted Bear River's motion for summary judgment and this appeal followed.
Disposition in the Court Below
After the parties conducted discovery, Bear River moved for summary judgment
because the law at the time of Amanda's injury, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(b)(1993),
did not allow for stacking of underinsured motorist coverage and because application of the
stacking amendment to Amanda Harvey's claim would infringe upon Bear River's
constitutional right to freedom from impairment of contract.
The motion was briefed by the parties and subsequently submitted for decision to Judge
Frank G. Noel on February 11, 1997. On March 6, 1997, Judge Noel granted Bear River's
motion for summary judgment. The trial court stated the reasons for its decision as follows:
The Court is of the opinion the parties' rights and obligations under the
insurance contract are fixed at a date no later than the date of the accident, and
accordingly for plaintiff to prevail the statutory amendment would have to apply
retroactively. Under the facts of this case the amendment in question cannot be
applied retroactively inasmuch as the substantive rights of the parties are
involved and the language of the amendment does not expressly provide for
retroactivity.
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(R.65). A full copy of Judge Noel's ruling is attached as Addendum "A." Judge Noel's Order
granting summary judgment was entered on March 6, 1997.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company respectfully requests that the Court affirm the
summary judgment in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Steven Harvey, father of Amanda Harvey, was insured through Bear River

Insurance Company for automobile insurance, which included UIM coverage. The policy
period was June 24, 1993, to December 24, 1993. (R.62).
2.

On August 14, 1993, Amanda Harvey was a passenger in an automobile driven

by Kyle Schwartz, who was insured by Allstate Insurance Company. On that date, Amanda
Harvey was injured in an automobile accident. (R.l).
3.

The accident involved a second vehicle driven by Wally Vickers. Vickers's

vehicle was insured by Prudential Insurance Company. (R.19).
4.

Allstate paid $100,000 to settle the liability of Kyle Schwartz for the claims of

Amanda Harvey. Prudential paid $80,000 to settle the liability of Wally Vickers for the claims
of Amanda Harvey. (R.2).
5.

The Allstate policy and the Bear River policy each provided UIM coverage with

limits of $10,000, which was the minimum coverage provided by statute as of that date.
(R.19).
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6.

Allstate Insurance paid its full limits of UIM coverage in the amount of $10,000

to the Harveys or on behalf of Amanda Harvey. (R. 19).
7,

As of the date of the accident, August 14, 1993, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-

305(10)(b), provided:
The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one
accident.
(R.33-35). A copy is attached to this brief as Addendum "B."
9.

The Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305, effective May 1,

1995, to provide that a covered person injured while occupying a vehicle may recover
underinsured motorist benefits under a policy covering a vehicle for which the injured person
is an insured family member in addition to recovering benefits under the policy covering the
vehicle that the person occupied at the time of the accident. The specific provision of the 1995
amendment which allows for stacking is Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B). (R.3637). A copy is attached to this brief as Addendum "C."
10.

The 1995 amendment contains no express provision concerning retroactivity or

the effective date of the change. (R.36-37).
11.

Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 25, provides that an Act shall not take

effect until sixty days after the adjournment of the session of the Legislature at which the Act
was passed.
12.

Sixty days after the adjournment of the session, in which the 1995 amendment

to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 was passed, was May 1, 1995. (R.36).
5

13.

The Bear River policy does not provide the stacked UIM benefit the Harveys

seek. The policy provides for non-duplication of UIM benefits in clear and unambiguous
terms. (R.61). A copy of Bear River's policy including the Cover and Part C2 is attached as
Addendum "D."
14.

The Harveys claim that the 1995 amendment allowing stacking applies to their

claim for UIM benefits against Bear River because the Bear River policy provides that there is
no UIM coverage until the limits of liability coverage have been used up; and Allstate did not
pay its liability coverage until after the date of the 1995 amendment. (R.l-3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I,

Summary judgment was correctly granted to Bear River on the issue of the non-

applicability of the 1995 Amendment to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305, which allows stacking
of underinsured motorist coverage. (R.65-68). The amendment was enacted after the date of
the accident and contains no express provision concerning retroactivity. Additionally,
application of the amendment would affect the parties' substantive rights and should not be
applied retroactively.
POINT II.

Bear River maintains that the Harveys' claim for underinsured motorist benefits

arose on the date of the accident. This position is supported by Utah law and the plain
language of Bear River's auto insurance policy. The auto insurance policy also clearly states
that duplication of underinsured motorist benefits is not allowed.
POINT III. The language of Bear River's auto insurance policy is plain and unambiguous.
The Harveys cannot create ambiguity by assigning a different meaning to the terms of the
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underinsured motorist coverage in accordance with their own interests. The terms contained in
the provision are clear, do not omit any terms, and cannot be understood to have more than
one plausible meaning.
POINT IV,

Application of the amendment which allows stacking of UIM coverage to the

Harveys' claim would infringe upon Bear River's constitutional right to freedom from
impairment of contract because Bear River had a right to rely on the statute which prohibited
stacking of UIM coverage in calculating its premiums and determining its loss exposure.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO BEAR RIVER BECAUSE THE APPLICABLE STATUTE, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(10)(6), DOES NOT ALLOW FOR STACKING
OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS.
The Harveys may not stack the UIM coverage in Bear River's policy and the $10,000
of UIM benefits from the Allstate policy, which the Harveys have already received. At the
time of Amanda's accident on August 14, 1993, the law provided "[t]he limit of liability for
underinsured motorist coverage for two or more vehicles may not be added together,
combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(10)(b) (1993) (effective May 3,
1993).
In 1995, the Utah legislature amended Section 31A-22-305 to allow stacking of
underinsured motorist coverage for a covered person who is "injured while occupying or using
a motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered
person, the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative." I(L,
§31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) (1995) (effective May 1, 1995). Covered persons are defined as
"persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are
residents of the named insured's household . . . ." KL, § 31A-22-305(l)(b) (1994 & Supp.
1996).
The Harveys claim that the right to underinsured motorist benefits did not arise until
Allstate paid its insured's underinsured motorist coverage in February, 1996. However, this
8

position is contrary to well settled law. The substantive law defining the parties' relationship
should be determined as of the time of the accident. Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952,
954 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Park Citv Corp.. 397 F.
Supp. 411, 414-15 (D. Ore. 1973)); Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208,
210 (Utah 1974) (stating that a party "is entitled to have its rights determined on the basis of
the law as it existed at the time of the occurrence . . . . " ) . Under the above rules, the Harveys'
claim for UIM benefits is determined based on the law existing on the date of the accident,
August 14, 1993.
Application of the stacking amendment, which was enacted after the accident, would
allow the Harveys to claim an additional $10,000 in underinsured motorist coverage from Bear
River. "A later statute or amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to deprive
a party of his rights or impose greater liability upon him." Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake
City. 784 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989) (quoting Okland Construction Co.. 520 P.2d 208, 210
(Utah 1974)). Application of the stacking amendment would impose upon Bear River greater
liability than under the law that was in effect at the time of the accident and greater liability
then the parties contracted for. Therefore, the stacking amendment should not be applied in
this case.
The general rule in Utah declares that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1993). Since the Utah legislature did
not expressly make the 1995 amendment retroactive, the rule dictates that the 1995 amendment
allowing for stacking of insurance coverage should not apply to Amanda's accident, which
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occurred approximately a year-and-a-half before the amendment's passage. Moreover, this
case does not fall under the exception to the general rule, which applies:
where a statute changes only procedural law by providing a different mode or
form of procedure for enforcing substantive rights. Such remedial statutes are
generally applied retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the
Legislature's remedial purpose. . . . [Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to
the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or
contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and
pending actions as well.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs.. 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah App. 1990)
(quoting Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added)). The narrow procedural exception has been applied in few instances where "the
change [has] only affect[ed] the judicial machinery for enforcing substantive rights or where
the change simply clarified the legislature's previous intent." Id.at 668, n.5. Utah courts have
usually found that statutory changes have affected substantive rights and have refused to apply
the statutes retroactively. IcL at 668, n.6 (citing examples of such cases).
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a substantive change in the law:
as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of
the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action, as distinguished from
adjective law which pertains to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the
legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.
Id, at 669 (quoting Petty v. Clark. 192 P.2d 589, 593-94 (1948)). Generally speaking, "[if] a
statutory amendment changes the contractual rights and obligations of the parties, it is
substantive." Id, (citing Petty. 192 P.2d at 593). Specifically, "[a] change in a statutory
remedy or defense is a substantive change if it affects the rights and duties of the parties." l±_
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In Washington National v. Sherwood Assocs.. a debtor assumed the obligations under a
$1.2 million note secured by a trust deed. Id. at 666. At the time of the debtor's purchase,
Utah law provided that a debtor could cure any default and avoid foreclosure by paying the
amount in default under the note at any time prior to foreclosure. Id. Subsequently, the
legislature amended the law governing judicial foreclosures to eliminate a debtor's right to
cure by paying the amount in default. Id. at 666-67.
Several years after the amendment took effect, the debtor ceased making payments on
the note, and the creditor insurance company accelerated the note pursuant to its contractual
rights. Id at 666. The debtor attempted to cure by paying the amount in default, citing the
pre-amendment version of the statute. Id. at 667. The creditor rejected the debtor's tender,
arguing that the current version of the statute applied and that the debtor was required to pay
the entire amount of the debt in order to cure. IcL
Holding that the original statute applied, which allowed the debtor to pay the amount of
default in order to cure, the court determined that the legislature had not expressly made the
amended statute retroactive. IcL Next, the court inquired into whether the change in the
judicial foreclosure law was substantive or procedural "with the premise that a contract
implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered." IcL at 669. The court held that
the amendment was substantive because it eliminated the debtor's right to cure a default under
the note and trust deed by paying only the amount of default rather than the entire amount
owed. Id at 670. Such a change altered the meaning of the debtor's contract and deprived him
of a contractual right due him under the prior statutory scheme. Id. Since the legislature had

11

not made the amended statute expressly retroactive and since the amendment affected the
debtor's substantive contractual rights, the court held that the original statute governed. I i .
In reaching its conclusion, the Washington National court cited other Utah cases that
reached similar results. In Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, for instance, a couple who were
passengers in another person's car were involved in a collision with an automobile driven by a
deputy sheriff. 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976). The husband sought damages for his injuries and
for the wrongful death of his wife, who was killed in the accident. Id,.The county filed a thirdparty complaint against the driver of the car in which the couple was riding, alleging that he
had been driving under the influence of alcohol. IcL The county sought contribution from the
driver as a joint tort-feasor pursuant to a statute that had become effective less than a month
after the accident. Id, Prior to the statute's adoption, Utah law did not recognize any right of
contribution between joint tort-feasors. Id^
In considering whether the contribution statute was applicable, the court stated that
"[t]he statute . . . [did] in fact create a right of action where none existed prior to its
adoption," thus indicating a substantive change in the law. Id. Consequently, the court held
that "[t]he contribution statute established a primary right and duty which was not in existence
at the time the injuries in th[e] case arose, and the statute not being retroactive by its terms did
not create a right on behalf of the" county. IdL The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the third-party complaint. IcL
Similarly, in Stephens v. Henderson, also cited by the Washington National court, a
woman who was roller skating injured her wrist when she was tripped by an unknown skater.
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741 P.2d at 953. The woman sued the skating center and the unknown "John Doe" skater. l±_
The skating center sought to have the Liability Reform Act, which had become effective a
year-and-a-half after the woman's accident, applied to the case. IcL
In considering whether to apply the Liability Reform Act, the court noted that the
legislature had not specifically made the Act retroactive. Id,, at 954. The court also determined
that the Act "redefme[d] the relationship between the plaintiff and the joint tort-feasors . . .
and chang[ed] the substantive law in effect when [the woman] !s cause of action arose . . . ."
Id. The court concluded that the Act could not be applied retroactively in the absence of an
express legislative direction. IcL Consequently, the skating center was liable for the full
amount of the woman's damages under the original statute. IcL
As in Washington National. Brunyer, and Stephens, the 1995 amendment to Section
31A-22-305 of the Utah Code allowing for stacking of underinsured motorist coverage effected
a substantive change in the law. In particular, the 1995 amendment created a new substantive
right of the insured to recover additional money from the insurer through the stacking of
underinsured motorist coverage. Thus, the 1995 amendment represents a change in the
substantive law because it alters the rights and duties of the insured and the insurer by
exposing the insurer to additional liability not contemplated at the time the insurance policy
was issued.
Therefore, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision to grant Bear River's
motion for summary judgment because the statute effective on the date of the accident, Utah
Code Ann. §31A-22-305(10)(b), which prohibits stacking of uninsured motorist coverage,
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applies to Appellant's claim, and Allstate has discharged all underinsured motorist benefit
obligations by paying its policy limits.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED BEAR RIVER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE HARVEYS'
CLAIM TO UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS AROSE ON THE
DATE OF THE ACCIDENT.
A.

Utah case law supports Bear River's position that the claim for underinsured motorist
coverage arose on the date of an accident.
A party's rights and obligations under an insurance policy vest on the date of the

accident or occurrence. See, Stephens. 741 P.2d 952; Okland Constr. Co.. 520 P.2d 208;
Wulfenstein v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Assoc. 611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980).
In Wulfenstein. a worker that had been terminated from her employment brought a
claim against her employer's insurer to recover medical expense benefits for expenses she
incurred after being terminated. The worker argued that she was covered under the employer's
medical expense policy because her medical expenses arose out of an accident that occurred
during her employment. The court denied the worker's claim for medical expense benefits and
stated:
Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or
allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk
contingencies. (Citation omitted.) The policy involved here could have been an
accident or sickness policy in which case, the risk insured against would have
been an accident or illness, and rights to any claims arising therefrom would
have vested at the time of the accident or illness.
Id. at 361. The Wulfenstein court points out that if the worker had been covered under an
accident policy, the right to any claim arising from such policy would have vested at the time
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of the accident. Bear River's policy was an accident policy that insured against risks of
automobile accidents. Therefore, the Harveys' right to UIM benefits under Bear River's
insurance policy vested at the time of the accident, not when Allstate paid or settled its liability
coverage.
The Harveys rely on Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commis.. 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah
1986). In Carlucci. the court held that the wife of a deceased worker could make a claim for
benefits against the Default Indemnity Fund which was established approximately five months
after the death of the worker. The court came to this decision by applying the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act and law specifically applicable in a workers' compensation context. The
court explained that the worker's wife's claim for workers' compensation was separate and
different from the worker's claim for compensation. In that particular context, the court found
that the deceased worker's wife's claims arose when the worker's employer became unable to
discharge its workers' compensation liability. In addition, the decision was consistent with a
provision of the Default Indemnity Fund Act in Utah Code Ann. §35-l-107(l)(1953)
(recodified as Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-704), which expressly provides that liability of the
Indemnity Fund arises "when an employer becomes insolvent, has appointed a receiver, or
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to cover
workers' compensation liabilities under this chapter."
Carlucci involved a situation where the Utah legislature had specifically determined the
time when the Default Indemnity Fund became liable to cover workers' compensation claims.
The Harveys would have the Court, by analogy, apply the same statutory time limit to their
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case. However, unlike the statute in Carlucci which fixed the date of Indemnity Fund liability,
there is no statute in the instant case that sets the date upon which an insurer becomes liable
for payment of underinsured motorist benefits. Utah case law already provides that such
liability arises on the date of the accident. The Harveys would have the Court apply a faulty
analogy instead of applying Utah case law that is directly on point. At pointed out earlier,
"[t]he substantive law defining the parties' relationship should be determined at the time of the
accident." Stephens. 741 P.2d at 954; Okland Construction Co.. 520 P.2d at 210.
B.

Bear River's auto insurance policy clearly states that underinsured motorist benefits
arise from the time of the accident and that claims for underinsured motorist coverage
may not be added together, combined or stacked to determine insurance coverage.
Bear River's position that claims for UIM coverage arise at the time of the accident is

also supported by the plain language of Bear River's auto policy, which provides in Part C2Underinsured Motorist Coverage:
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered person, as defined
in this part is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death:
1.
sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and
2.
caused by an accident.
(emphasis supplied). Under the terms of the insurance policy, any claim the Harveys might
make for UIM benefits arose upon the happening of an accident.
The insurance policy also provides that duplication of underinsured benefits is not
allowed. On page 12, the policy states that "[t]he limits of liability for underinsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident."
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A copy of Bear River's policy, Part C2- Underinsured Motorist Coverage, is attached as
Addendum "D."
The Harveys ask the Court to add a benefit to the insurance contract which the contract
expressly denies. Doing so would conflict with the well established rule that courts "will not
enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself." Rio Algom Corp. v.
JimcoLtd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). Nor will a court make a better contract for the
parties than they have made for themselves. Id.
POINT III
BEAR RIVER'S AUTO INSURANCE POLICY IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THE HARVEYS MAY NOT CREATE
AMBIGUITY BY SIMPLY ASSIGNING A DIFFERENT MEANING TO
THE POLICY THAT FAVORS THEIR INTERESTS.
The Harveys assert that the policy language is ambiguous and therefore must be
construed in favor of payment of the underinsured motorist coverage benefits. The policy
provision in question states: "[t]here is no coverage until the limits of liability of all bodily
injury liability bonds and policies that apply have been used up by payment of judgments or
settlements to other persons." Bear River policy, p. 11. Attached as Addendum "D."
The Harveys interpret the provision to mean that the claim for UIM benefits against
Bear River could not arise until Allstate settled or paid its uninsured motorist obligations. Bear
River maintains that their claim arose out of the accident on August 14, 1993.
Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language presents a question of law to
be decided by using accepted methods of construction. Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665
(Utah 1992). A policy term is not ambiguous merely because one party assigns a different
17

meaning to it in accordance with his or her own interests. Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit
Assoc. 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah App. 1990). However, contract language may be ambiguous if
it is unclear or omits terms used to express the intention of the parties that may be understood
to have two or more plausible meanings. Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976,
977 (Utah App. 1989). When a contract is clear and unambiguous, a court will not modify a
contract or create an ambiguity where none existed before. See e.g., Public Utility Dist No. 1
of Klickitat County v. International Ins. Co.. 881 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 1994). Although liberal
interpretations are often afforded the insured in insurance contracts, "[i]t is not the function of
the court to rewrite an unambiguous contract." Crowther v. Carter. 767 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah
App. 19S9)(citing Provo Citv Corp. V. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979)).
The policy language in the Underinsured Motorist Coverage section of Bear River's
auto policy provides that there is no underinsured motorist coverage until the applicable
liability limits are exhausted. The language is not unclear, nor does its omit any terms. In fact
the provision used by Bear River is very similar to the language used by the American
insurance industry's standard personal auto insurance policies. See, I, Miller's Standard
Insurance Policies Annotated, p. 8, (1996). The similar provision in Miller's, reads:
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any
applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements.
Such language is standard throughout the insurance industry to guarantee that
underinsured coverage be applied for its intended purpose, and not as a substitute for liability
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coverage. "The terms of insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be interpreted in
accordance with their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt
to harmonize and give effect to all the contract provisions." Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d at
665. The Court should give effect to the policy provision that prohibits stacking of UIM
benefits. Further, the obvious purpose of the language cited by the Harveys is to require full
payment of all liability insurance before payment of underinsured coverage benefits.
"[U]nderinsured motorist coverage provides first party insurance protection for damages that
exceed the limits of the tort-feasor's bodily injury coverage." U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. V.
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). The Harveys have not referred the court to any case
neither have they cited any rule from any jurisdiction that supports their assertion that
coverage for UIM benefits arises only after liability limits have been paid.
The language used in Bear River's policy in no way alters the fact that rights under the
policy vested on the date of the accident. The policy does not provide that contract rights will
not vest on the accident date, but rather, on some future date when the Harveys' attorneys got
around to collecting the liability limits. Furthermore, the Harveys' interpretation would place
in their hands the power to control the date and time when Amanda Harvey's rights would
vest. The Harveys assert that their rights vested on the date when they went to court and
obtained court approval for Amanda Harvey's liability claim, and when the liability proceeds
were paid. Amanda Harvey is a minor child, so her liability claim is tolled during the period
of her minority. Presumably, her attorneys could have waited several years before presenting
her liability claim for payment of the Allstate policy limits covering Kyle Schwartz. It is not
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reasonable to allow the Harveys' attorneys to control the vesting of the rights in such an
arbitrary manner.
The issue in this case is not whether the exclusion to underinsured motorist coverage is
ambiguous. The language used in the policy is not ambiguous despite the Harveys' attempt to
assign a differing meaning to the policy's clear terms. The real issue in this case is when the
right vested to claim underinsured motorist coverage from Bear River. Utah case law and the
plain language of the insurance policy show that the right to underinsured motorist coverage
vested at the time of the automobile accident on August 14, 1993. Therefore, Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-305(10)(6), the statute in effect at the time of the accident which prohibits stacking
of insurance coverage, controls.
POINT IV
APPLICATION OF THE STACKING AMENDMENT TO
THE HARVEY'S CLAIM WOULD INFRINGE UPON BEAR
RIVER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM
FROM IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT.
The 1995 Amendment may not be applied to the Harveys' claim without imposing a
contractual impairment upon Bear River in violation of the United States and Utah
Constitutions. The United States Constitution provides that "[no] State shall pass . . . any . . .
law impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. Similarly, the Utah
Constitution provides that "[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed."
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 18. Utah has not considered whether the federal or Utah
Constitutions would bar retroactive application of an amended statute that effected a
substantive change in the law. See Washington National. 795 P.2d 665, 669 n.8, 670 n. 10
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(noting that several other jurisdictions have recently found that modification of statutory
redemption period in foreclosure statute when applied retroactively impaired obligation of
contract in violation of contracts clause under applicable state and federal constitutions.) In a
case similar to the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court found that application of an
amended statute that allowed stacking of an uninsured motorist coverage to a policy issued
prior to the effective date of the amendment violated the insurance company's constitutional
right to be free from impairment of contract. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Gant. 478
So.2d, 25, 27 (Fla. 1985). In Gant. a driver struck two minor children, severely injuring one
and killing the other. Id. at 26. The children's parents had two separate State Farm insurance
policies on their cars that prohibited any stacking of uninsured motorist coverage from both
policies. Id. Eight days before the accident, an amended statute became effective that
allowed insurance to stack limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Id. When State Farm paid
the coverage limits from one policy but refused to pay any amount under the second policy,
the parents sought a declaratory judgment that the uninsured motorist coverage would stack
pursuant to the amendment. Id.
In considering the issue, the court reasoned that "the amendment permitting stacking of
uninsured motorist coverage [could not] be applied to a preexisting contract without impairing
the obligations of that contract in violation of the Florida Constitution." W. Specifically, the
court stated that "State Farm had a right to rely upon the anti-stacking statute in determining
its loss exposure." Id. at 27. Thus, the court ruled that the statutory amendment allowing an
insured to stack uninsured motorist coverage could not be applied retroactively to a policy
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entered into before the amendment became effective where the policy contained an antistacking provision. Id.
Likewise, applying the 1995 Amendment would unconstitutionally infringe upon Bear
River's right to be free from impairment of contract. As in Gant. Bear River had a right to
rely upon the Utah statute that prohibited stacking of uninsured motorist coverage in
calculating its premium and in determining its loss exposure. Permitting the application of the
1995 Amendment would diminish Bear River's insurance contract with Amanda Harvey's
parents in violation of the United States and Utah Constitutions.
CONCLUSION
The 1995 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305, which allows stacking of
underinsured motorist coverage, does not apply because the amendment is not expressly
retroactive and it affects a substantive change in the law. The claim that the right to coverage
under the underinsured motorist benefits did not exist until Allstate paid its applicable
underinsured motorist benefits is not supported by the facts, by Utah case law, or by the plain
language of the insurance policy.
The Harvey's reliance on Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n. is misplaced because
that case is not controlling under the applicable law or the facts present in this case.
Furthermore, the plain language of the policy specifically denies duplicate underinsured
motorist benefits. The policy language relating to underinsured motorist coverage and benefits
is clear, contains all the necessary terms, and does not give rise to more than one plausible
meaning.
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The obvious and sensible meaning of the policy language is that in order to become a
candidate for underinsured motorist benefits, an injured person must first collect all liability
insurance coverage benefits. The most basic tenet of UIM coverage is that there must first be
an exhaustion of liability coverage. Without that prerequisite, a tortfeasor cannot be
underinsured, by definition.
Bear River relied on the statute which prohibited stacking of UIM benefits in making
its contract with the Harveys and determining its loss exposure. Application of the amendment
allowing stacking of underinsured motorist benefits would violate Bear River's constitutional
right to be free from impairment of contracts.
Therefore, Bear River respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the
District Court in granting Bear River's motion for summary judgment.
Dated this 2jf"day of November, 1997.
STRONG & HANNI

Roger Bullock—^
Peter Barlow
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
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ADDENDUM A:
JUDGE NOEL'S RULINGS ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(R. 65-68).

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

Stephen E, Harvey, individually, and
as general guardian of Amanda Harvey,
a minor,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO: 960904572 PI
vs.

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company,
Defendant,
The court reviewed defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, together with the
memos filed in connection with the motion and rules as follows:
The court is of the opinion the parties' rights and obligations under the insurance contract
are fixed at a date no later than the date of the accident, and accordingly for plaintiff to prevail
the statutory amendment would have to be applied retroactively. Under the facts of this case
the amendment in question cannot be applied retroactively inasmuch as substantive rights of the
parties are involved and the language of the amendment does not expressly provide for
retroactivity.
Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this H /

day of February, 1997.

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge
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HARVEY V. BEAR RIVER

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following this .^OU day of February, 1997.
James R. Hasenyager
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Roger H. Bullock
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM B:
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 31A-22-305
(R. 33-35).

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES

31A-22-305

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Step-down coverage.
Section 31A-22-303 does not prohibit insurers from providing step-down coverage for permissive users, as long as the coverage satisfies

the statutory minimums set forth in this section. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 217 Utah
Adv. Rep. 13 (1993).

31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption,
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the
policy or owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not
covered under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing
occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required
by Section 31A-22-304;
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent of the deficiency;
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately
caused by the vehicle operator; or
(c) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability
insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(c)(i) is uninsured only to
the extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by
a guaranty association or fund.
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
Bickness, disease, or death in limits that at least equal the minimum bodily
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer
that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). This
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the
insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.
(b) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons
by motor vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation
services for their students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for
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that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance,
uninsured motorist coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000
per accident.
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an
injured covered person.
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee, who is injured by
an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is provided by Title
35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation.
(c) As used in this subsection:
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section
63-30-2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la102.
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must
show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing
evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one
accident.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or
using a motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or
replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as
provided in Subsection (7)(b), a covered person injured in a vehicle
described in a policy that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not
elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered person.
(b) The following individuals may also recover uninsured motorist
benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered
person" as defined in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor
vehicle; and
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor
vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use
of the covered person, his resident spouse, or a resident relative of the
covered person.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has
insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all
special and general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; oi
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
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(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(c)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in limits of at least $10,000 for
one person in any one accident, and at least $20,000 for two or more
persons in any one accident.
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described
in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8).
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the
limit of coverage available to the injured person.
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after January 1, 1993, a
named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under
Subsection 31A-22-302 (l)(a). This rejection continues for that issuer
of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests
underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal notices sent after
January 1, 1993, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
notify the insured of the availability of underinsured motorist coverage along with estimated ranges of premiums for the coverage. The
department shall provide standard language to be used by insurers to
fulfill the insurers' duty under this subsection.
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using
a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the
motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if
the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered
under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (10)(c), a
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes
underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured
motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy
under which he is a named insured.
(b) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person
for any one accident.
(c) If a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or while occupying or
using a vehicle not described in Subsection (10)(a) and is covered by more
than one policy including underinsured motorist coverage, the injured
person may elect the policy under which he collects underinsured motorist
benefits. An injured person is not barred against making subsequent
elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
Higtory: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by
1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 157;
87, ch. 162, § 1; L. 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992,

ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 1994, ch. 316,
§ 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
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ment by ch. 1, effective J a n u a r y 30, 1992,
substituted the present code citation in Subsection (4)(c)(ii) for "Section 41-1-1" and made
stylistic changes.
The 1992 amendment by ch. 132, effective
J a n u a r y 1, 1993, added the subsection designations in Subsections (2)(a), (2Xc), and (4Kb);
inserted "or under-insured" in Subsection (l)(d);
substituted "$25,000" for "$20,000" in Subsection (4Kb); substituted "41-la-102" for "41-1-1"
in Subsection (4)(c)(ii); added Subsections (7)
through (9); and made stylistic changes
throughout.

The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
added "or using" in Subsection (l)(c) and in
present Subsections (10)(a) and (c), substituted
"covered person" for "occupant" in Subsection
(4)(b)(i), deleted the (a) designation in Subsection (6), deleted former Subsections (6)(b) and
(c) which permitted election of insurance policies, added Subsection (7), and made stylistic
and designation changes,
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
added Subsection (8)(b)(i) and the (8)(b)(ii) designation and made related and other stylistic
changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
C i t e d in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Automobile uninsured motorist
coverage: "legally entitled to recover" clause as
barring claim compensable under workers'
compensation statute, 82 A.L.R.4th 1096.
"Excess" or "umbrella" insurance policy as
providing coverage for accidents with unin-

sured or underinsured motorists, 2 A.L.R.5th
922.
Insured's recovery of uninsured motorist's
claim against insurer as affecting subsequent
recovery against tortfeasors causing injury, 3
A.L.R.5th 746.

31A-22-307, Personal injury protection coverages and
benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical,
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance,
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of$250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and
loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the
date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured
person would have performed for his household, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury
unless the person's inability to perform these services continues for
more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500
per person; and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs,
in the total of $3,000.
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a relative value study of services and accommodations
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ADDENDUM C:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305
(10)(C)(i)(b)(1995)
(R. 36-37).

Ch. 294

General Session - 1995
declared insolvent
jurisdiction;

CHAPTER 294
H. B. 218
Passed February 28. 1995
Approved March 20. 1995
Effective May 1. 1995

by

a

court

of

competent

<ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2McHi* is
uninsured only to the extent t h a t the claim against
the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty
association or fund.

U N D E R I N S U R E D MOTORIST
AMENDMENTS
Sponsor- John L. Valentine
AN ACT RELATING TO
INSURANCE;
EXPANDING
THE
UNINSURED
AND
U N D E R I N S U R E D MOTORIST COVERAGE
AVAILABLE TO CERTAIN
PERSONS;
DESIGNATING CERTAIN PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY COVERAGES; AND MAKING
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:
AMENDS:
31A-22-305, as last amended by Chapter 316,
Laws of Utah 1994

(3)
Uninsured
motorist
coverage
under
Subsection 3 lA-22-302( 1)(b) provides coverage for
covered persons who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death in limits t h a t at least equal the
minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle
liability policies under Section 31A-22-304.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), the
named insured may reject uninsured motorist
coverage by an express writing to the insurer that
provides liability coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302( lXa). This rejection continues for that
issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in
writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from
that liability insurer.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
(b) All persons, including governmental entities,
that are engaged in the business of, or that accept
payment for, transporting natural persons by motor
vehicle, and all school districts that provide
transportation services for their students, shall
provide coverage for all vehicles used for that
purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by
self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at
least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.

S e c t i o n 1. S e c t i o n 31A-22-305 is a m e n d e d
to read:
31A-22-305. U n i n s u r e d a n d u n d e r i n s u r e d
motorist c o v e r a g e .
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons"
includes:
(a) the named insured;

(i) This coverage is secondary to any other
insurance covering an injured covered person.

(b) persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are
residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the
same household but temporarily live elsewhere;

(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee,
who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose
exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1,
Workers' Compensation.

(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer;
and

(c) As used in this subsection:
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning
as under Section 6 3 - 3 0 - 2 .

(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages
against the owner or operator of the uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
toor death of persons under Subsection (lKa),(b),or
(c).

(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as
under Section 4 1 - l a - 1 0 2 .
(5) When a covered person alleges that an
uninsured motor vehicle under Subsection (2Kb)
proximately caused an accident without touching
the covered person or the vehicle occupied by the
covered person, the covered person must show the
existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear
andconvincingevidenceconsistingof more than the
covered person's testimony.

(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor
vehicle" includes:
<a> <i> a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or
use of which is not covered under a liability policy at
the time of an injury-causing occurrence: or
<ii t'Aia vehicle covered with lower liability limits
than required by Section 31A-22-304;
' B> the vehicle described in Subsection
'2»«ai'ii »<A> is uninsured to the extent of the
deficiency:

«6M a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an
injured person for any one accident.

>b>an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an
accident proximately caused by the vehicle
operator; or

1
b H j > Subsection < a > applies to all persons except a
covered person as defined under Subsection
t7"b"ii>,

<c> h") an insured vehicle if. before or after the
accident, the liability insurer of the vehicle is

< ii > A covered person as defined under Subsection
f7wbwii) is entitled to the highest limits of
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uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any <>r 1 «•
vehicle that the covered person is the named
insured or an insured family member.
'iii> This coverage shall be in addition to the
coverage on the vehicle the covered person is
occupying

damages from owners or operators of underinsured
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death in limits of at least $10,000 for one
person in any one accident, and at least $20,000 for
two or more persons in any one accident.
\ b s The TiaiTifcti Ynsvu^d's \*TkdfcT\TkS\iTfcd mottmst
coverage, as described in Subsection (9>(a>. is
secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as
described in Subsection (8). Underinsured motorist
coverage may not be set off against the liability
coverage of the owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to,
combined with, or stacked upon the liability
coverage of the owner or operator of the
underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit
of coverage available to the injured person.

'iv> Neither the primary nor the secondary
coverage may be set off against the other.
(c> Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and
the coverage elected by a person described under
Subsections (lHa) and fb) shall be secondary
coverage.
17) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this
section applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death of covered persons while occupying or using a
motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described
in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the
motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement
vehicle covered under the t e r m s of the policy.
Except as provided in Subsection (6) or
'-**)], a
covered person injured in a vehicle desc*
in a
policy t h a t includes uninsured motorist
'lefits
may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance
policy under which he is a covered person.

(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after
J a n u a r y 1, 1993, a named insured may reject
underinsured motorist coverage by an express
writing to the insurer t h a t provides liability
coverage under Subjection 31A-22-302 (lXa). This
rejection continues for that issuer of the liability
coverage until t h e insured in writing requests
underinsured motorist coverage from t h a t liability
insurer.
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal
notices sent after J a n u a r y 1, 1993, for policies
existing on t h a t d a t e , t h e insurer shall notify t h e
insured of the availability of underinsured motorist
coverage along with estimated ranges of premiums
for the coverage. The department shall provide
standard language to be used by insurers to fulfill
the insurers' duty under this subsection.

(b) [The! Each of the following [individuals!
persons may a\so recover uninsured motorist
benefits under any other policy in which they are
described as a "covered person" as defined in
Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an
uninsured motor vehicle; and

(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under
this section applies to bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death of an insured while occupying or
using a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or
available for the regular use of the insured, a
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured,
only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle
is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered
under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in
Subsection (10)[te)l, a covered person injured in a
vehicle described in a policy t h a t includes
underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to
collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy
under which he is a named insured.

(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or
using a motor vehicle t h a t is not owned by,
furnished, or available for the regular use of the
covered person, [his] the covered person's resident
spouse, or [a! the covered person's resident relative
[of the covered peroon j .
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7Xb) is not
barred against making subsequent elections if
recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured
motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, the operation,
maintenance, or use of which is covered under a
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing
occurrence, but which has insufficient liability
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for
all special and general damages.

(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured
motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles
may not be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available
to an injured person for any one accident.

(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does
not include:
M) a motor vehicle that is covered under the
liability coverage of the same policy t h a t also
contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or

(ii) Subsection (bKi) applies to all persons except a
covered person as defined under Subsection
(cXiXB).

Hi) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in
Subsection (2).

(Hi) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and
the coverage elected by a person described under
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary
coverage.

<9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under
Subsection 31A-22-302(lKc) provides coverage for
covered persons who are legally entitled to recover

972

General S e s s i o n - 1995
(c) (i) Each of the following persons may also
recover underinsured motorist coverage benefits
under any other policy in which they are described
as a "covered person" as defined under Subsection

111:
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an
underinsured motor vehicle; or
(B) a covered person injured
using a motor vehicle that
furnished, or available for the
covered person, the covered
spouse, or the covered person's

while occupying or
is not owned by,
regular use of the
persons resident
resident relative.

(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a
secondary source of coverage.
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection
(c)(i)(B) is entitled to the highest limits of
underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any
one vehicle that the covered person is the named
insured or an insured family member.
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the
coverage on the vehicle the covered person is
occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary
coverage may be set off against the other.
[(c) If a named insured is injured as a pedestrian
or while occupying^or using a vehicle not described
in Subsection (lOXa) and is covered by more than
one—policy—including—underinsured—motorist
coverage, the injured person may elect the policy
under which ho collects underinsured motorist
benefits. An] (d) A covered injured person is not
barred against making subsequent elections if
recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
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ADDENDUM D:
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, NON-ASSESSABLE MOTOR
VEHICLE AND AUTO POLICY,
COVER AND PART C2. (R.60-61.)

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy

UTAH

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in the State of Utah.
Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that it provides. You may call the company to help and
assist you in any questions that you have.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
545 East Third South
P. O. Box 11869
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named in the
Declarations and Policy.

11/92 Ed.

PART C2 - UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
a.
b.

Insuring Agreement
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered
person, as defined in this part is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death:
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and
2. caused by an accident.
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
underinsured motor vehicle.
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought
without our written consent is not binding on us.
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" means a Land Motor
Vehicle or Trailer of any Type:
1. The ownership, maintenance or use of which is
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the
time of the accident; but
a. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability
are insufficient to compensate fully the insured
for all special and general damages;
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other
than the insured to less than the amount of the
insured's damages.
However, "Underinsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include
any Vehicle or Equipment:
1. Owned by, furnished or available for the regular use
of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative of
the insured, unless the motor vehicle is described in
the Declarations and for which a specific premium
has been paid, or if the motor vehicle is a newly
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy;
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
applicable motor vehicle law;
3. Owned by any governmental unit, political
subdivision or agency;
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads;
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on
public roads;
6. While located for use as a residence or premises;
7. Defined as more fully set forth in Part CI, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage in your policy;
8. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but its limit for
bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit
for bodily injury liability specified by the Utah Safety
Responsibility Act;
9. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or
insuring company:

denies coverage; or
is or becomes insolvent.

Definitions
As used in this section "covered persons" includes:
a. the named insured;
b. persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents
of the named insured's household, including those
who usually make their home in the same household
but temporarily live elsewhere;
c. any person occupying a covered motor vehicle
referred to in the policy;
All other definitions apply.

Exclusions
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for
bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor
vehicle owned by you or any family member which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This includes a trailer of any type used with that
vehicle.
2.

For any Covered Person who, without written consent
from the Company, settles with any person or
organization who may be liable for bodily injury.

3.

While occupying your covered vehicle when it is
being used to carry persons or property for a fee.
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense
car pool.

4.

Use of a vehicle without permission, or the use with
permission is beyond the consent of you or your
spouse.

B. There is no coverage until the limits of liability of all
bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply have
been used up by payment of judgments or settlements to
other persons.

Limits of Liability
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
person" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by
any one person in any one accident. Subject to this limit for
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations
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for "each accident" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our
maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury
resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay
regardless of the number of:
a. covered Persons
b. claims made
c. vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations
d. vehicles involved in the accident.

payable for any one vehicle under the policy with
the highest possible dollar limit;
b. subject to paragraph a, above, any insurance we
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own
shall be excess over any other collectible
insurance;
c. we will pay our share of the loss. Our share is
the proportion of damages that the limit of
liability of this coverage bears to the total
applicable underinsured motorist limits.

Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our
Underinsured Motorist Coverage
1.

A covered person injured in a vehicle described in an
insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist
benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle
insurance policy under which he is a named insured
except:
a. if a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or
while occupying a vehicle not described in this
part, (C2, Underinsured Motorist Coverage) and
is covered by more than one policy including
underinsured motorist coverage, the injured
person may elect the policy under which he
collects underinsured motorist benefits.

2.

The limits of liability for underinsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident.

3.

If there is other applicable or similar insurance under
more than one insurance policy or provision of
coverage:
a. the maximum recovery under all policies
combined will not exceed the maximum amount
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No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or
any similar insurance.

Fault, Amount and Arbitration
The following two questions for the coverage under
underinsured motorist protection must be decided by agreement
pursuant to the provisions of the policy as follows:
1. is the insured legally entitled to collect for bodily
injury for damages from the owner or driver of an
underinsured motor vehicle; and
2. if so, in what amount?
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover
damages under this part; or
2.

as to the amount of damages;

either party may make a written demand for the matters to be
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the
arbitration rules of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of
which is available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and
effect in Utah at the time.
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